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Abstract. In the Taricco judgment, the ECJ held that Article 325 TFEU requires the national courts to 
disregard the Italian rules of limitation periods if their application prevents the imposition of effective and 
deterrent penalties in a significant number of cases of serious fraud affecting EU financial interests. In Italy, 
some courts considered that the disapplication imposed by the ECJ runs counter to the fundamental principles 
of the Italian constitutional system, including the principle of strict legality in criminal matters, formally 
recognized in the Italian Constitution. Consequently, the ICC had been requested by these judges to exercise 
the “counter-limits” power in order to prevent the enforcement of the ECJ ruling in Taricco. The ICC sought 
a preliminary reference from the ECJ on the interpretation of the Article 325 TFUE, making some 
important statements on the principle of legality. In particular, the ICC stated that this principle is an 
expression of a supreme principle of the legal order, which has been posited in order to safeguard the inviolable 
rights of the individual, by clarifying also that this principle does not grant the courts the power to create new 
criminal law in place of that established by legislation approved by Parliament. Awaiting the ECJ’s decision 
on the case, there are already several points on the issue of the “Judiciary creation of law and dialogue between 
judges” around which is possible to discuss and confront different legal traditions. 
 
Summary. 1. Introductory remarks. 2. The origins of the case: the gaps of the 
limitation period rules in the Italian criminal system. 3. The (first) decision of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). 4. The reaction of the Italian Judges: between 
direct application of the Taricco rule and the request for counter-limits. 5. The 
decision of the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC): a courageous stance or a prudent 
openness to dialogue?. 6. Future developments: waiting for Taricco-bis..   
 
 
1. Introductory remarks 
 
First of all, it is important to make some preliminary remarks in order to introduce the 
most relevant issue of the Taricco case, by anticipating and highlighting straight away that it 
represents - for the Italian academic debate - the criminal judgment most commented ever1. 
                                               
1 See A. BERNARDI, Introduzione, in Il caso Taricco e il dialogo tra le Corti. L’ordinanza n. 24/2017 della Corte 
costituzionale (a cura di) A. Bernardi e C. Cupelli, 2017, p. IX. It must be underlined that some comments of this 
ruling are made by foreign authors: see, in this regard, M. LASSALLE, Taricco kills two birds with one stone for the 
sake of the PIF, in European Law Blog, 2015; and S. PEERS, The Italian Job: the CJEU strengthens criminal law 
protection of the EU’s finances, in EU Law Analysis, 2015.  
     
2 
The ruling given in the Taricco case has brought to the fore the problem of the interaction 
between EU law and one of the supreme principles of the Italian constitutional order2: the 
principle of legality in criminal law3.  
This principle - its content and, in particular, its scope - has been “batted back and forth” 
between national courts and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in the first phase, and 
between the Italian constitutional court (ICC) and again the ECJ, in the second one4. 
The dialogue between these judges - as explained below - is still open. 
Indeed, after the recent decision of the ICC (no. 24 of 2017) - by which the Italian 
constitutional judges submitted a reference for preliminary ruling to the ECJ – the “ball is 
back” to the European Court5.  
Within the Italian context, all scholars and legal practitioners are looking forward for the 
forthcoming reply of the Court of Luxembourg.  
The Taricco case is highly relevant when discussing around the topic of “Judiciary creation of 
law” because the subject-matter of the dispute - only superficially connected to a specific 
category of criminal provisions - concerns some of the fundamental elements of the Italian 
criminal justice system: in particular, the role of judge and the limits of its discretion in 
criminal matters.  
 
 
2. The origins of the case: the gaps of the limitation period rules in the Italian 
criminal system 
 
Mr. Taricco and several other defendants were charged, before an Italian court (Tribunale di 
Cuneo), with having formed and organised, as members of criminal organisations, during the 
fiscal years 2005 to 2009, a conspiracy to commit various offences in relation to Value added 
Tax (hereinafter “VAT”). 
The accused were alleged to have put in place fraudulent “VAT carousel” legal 
arrangements, involving, inter alia, the creation of shell companies and the use of false 
documents, by means of which they were able to acquire goods - bottles of champagne - 
VAT free. 
The offences which the respondents are alleged to have committed are punishable, under 
the national provisions6, by term of imprisonment of up to six years. The offence of 
                                               
2 See M. BASSINI, O. POLLICINO, The Taricco decision: a last attempt to avoid a clash between EU Law and the 
Italian Constitution, in Verfassungsblog on matters constitutional, 2017, and M. CAIANIELLO, Dum Romae (et 
Brucsellae) Consulitur...Some considerations on the Taricco Judgement and Its Consequences at National and European Level, in 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2016, p. 1 ss. 
3 See, on this issue, M. D’AMICO, Principio di legalità penale e “dialogo” tra le Corti. Osservazioni a margine del caso 
Taricco, in Il caso Taricco e il dialogo tra le Corti. L’ordinanza n. 24/2017 della Corte costituzionale (a cura di) A. Bernardi 
e C. Cupelli, 2017. 
4 See M. LUCIANI, Il brusco risveglio. I controlimiti e la fine mancata della storia costituzionale (relazione al Relazione al 
Convegno “Primato delle norme europee e difesa dei principi costituzionali”, Ferrara, 7-8 aprile 2011), in Rivista AIC, 15 
aprile 2016; A. RUGGERI, Primato del diritto sovranazionale versus identità̀ costituzionale? (Alla ricerca dell’araba fenice 
costituzionale: i “controlimiti”), in Forum di Quaderni costituzionali, 9 aprile 2016; and R. BIN, Taricco, una sentenza 
sbagliata: come venirne fuori?, in www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 4 luglio 2016.  
5 See P. FARAGUNA, The Italian Constitutional Court in re Taricco: “Gauweiler in the Roman Campagna”, in 
Verfassungsblog on matters constitutional, 2017. 
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conspiracy, laid down in Article 416 of the Penal Code, of which the accused could also be 
found guilty, is punishable by term of imprisonment of up to seven years for those 
instigating the conspiracy and up to five years for those merely taking part into it. It means, 
due to the rules provided by the Penal Code7, that, for those instigating the conspiracy, the 
limitation period is seven years, whereas it is six year for the others.   
Moving from the premise that, in all likelihood, the prosecution of the criminal offences 
of the case will become time-barred before the final judgment, the court – in accordance 
with Article 267 TFEU – referred four different questions to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling8, complaining about the (in)compatibility between these national provisions and the 
EU law.  
In other words, the national court considered that the Italian legislation, by establishing a 
strict limitation period, was in breach of the obligation under EU law to take measures to 
contrast criminal activities affecting the financial interest of the Union.  
More in detail, by invoking as parameters Articles 101, 107 and 119 TFEU and Article 158 
of Directive 2006/112 (on the common system of value added tax), the Italian judge devoted 
its question to EU competition law, the possibilities of exemption from VAT and the 
principle of sound public finances.  
 
 
3. The (first) decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
 
The Grand Chamber of the ECJ adopted its decision on 8 September 2015. 
Above all, it is important to note that the ECJ decided to change the parameters initially 
mentioned by the Italian court, basing its own decision (only) on the Article 325 TFEU, to 
which the national court had made no reference.  
This Article9 obliges the Member State, in the first paragraph, to counter illegal activities 
affecting the financial interests of the European Union through effective deterrent measures 
and, in the second paragraph, obliges them to take the same measures to counter fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the European Union as they take to counter fraud affecting 
their own interests10.  
From a procedural point of view, this choice of the ECJ deserves to be thoroughly 
analyzed.  
                                                                                                                                                  
6 Articles 2 and 8 of Legislative Decree n. 74/2000 (laying down new rules governing offences in relation to 
income tax and value added tax).  
7 In particular, Article 157 of the Italian Penal Code that provides as follow: “prosecution of an offence shall be time-
barred after a period equal to the maximum duration of the penalty laid down in the criminal-law provision for the offence itself; 
the foregoing notwithstanding, the limitation period shall be no less than six years for serious offences [...]”. Is also important to 
remember that Article 161 establishes that, with the exception of the prosecution of particular offences, “an 
interruption of the limitation period may give rise to an extension of that period by no more than one quarter [...]”.  
8 The National court adopted its decision on 17 January 2014.  
9 Article 325 TFEU provides that “the Union and the Member States shall counter fraud and any other illegal activities 
affecting the financial interests of the Union through measures to be taken in accordance with this Article, which shall act as a 
deterrent and be such as to afford effective protection in the Member States, and in all the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies” and that “Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union as 
they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests”. 
10 See also, on this issue, ECJ, C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, 26 February 2013. 
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In this regard, indeed, the ECJ, in accordance with its case-law11, reminded, on one hand, 
that “the Court does not have the jurisdiction to consider points of law which the national court has expressly 
or implicitly omitted from its request for a preliminary ruling”, and, on the other, that the Court does 
have the jurisdiction, when ruling on a request for a preliminary ruling, “to give clarification, in 
the light of the information in the case-file, to guide the referring court in giving judgment in the main 
proceedings and, in so doing, also to consider provisions to which the referring court has not referred”12.   
In this way the Court was able to easily overcome the procedural obstacles, shifting the 
focus of its decision to the general duty in order to impose effective penalties13.  
Does EU law require the courts of the Member States to refrain from applying certain 
provisions of their national law on the limitation periods applicable to the prosecution of 
criminal offences in order to guarantee the effective punishment of tax offences? That is, in 
essence, the question which the Court of Luxembourg is called upon to consider in the 
present case. 
That said, for the ECJ, the national provisions at issue, by introducing — in the event of 
interruption of the limitation period by one of the events indicated in the Penal Code14 — a 
rule according to which the limitation period may in no case be extended by more than a 
quarter of its initial duration, have the effect, given the complexity and duration of the 
criminal proceedings leading to the adoption of a final judgment, of neutralising the temporal 
effect of an event interrupting the limitation period15.  
The implications of this circumstance are clear: if the national court concludes that the 
application of the national provisions in relation to the interruption of the limitation period 
has the effect that, in a considerable number of cases, the commission of serious fraud will escape 
criminal punishment, since the offences will usually be time-barred before the criminal 
penalty laid down by law can be imposed by a final judicial decision, it would be necessary to 
find that the measures laid down by national law to combat fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the European Union could not be regarded as being effective and dissuasive, 
which would be incompatible, in particular, with Article 325 TFEU16. 
                                               
11 Judgments in SARPP (C-241/89, EU:C:1990:459, § 8); Ritter-Coulais (C-152/03, EU:C:2006:123, § 29); 
Promusicae (C-275/06, EU:C:2008:54, § 42); Aventis Pasteur (C-358/08, EU:C:2009:744, § 50); and Centre public 
d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve (C-562/13, EU:C:2014:2453, § 37). 
12 See, in this regard, the Opinion of Advocate General, C-105/14, 30 April 2015, § 75 - 76. 
13 At the end of its decision, the Court affirmed that the answers to the other questions cannot be assessed in 
the light of Articles 101, 107 and 119 TFEU. 13 See ECJ, C-105/14, Taricco and others, 8 September 2015, § 65. 
14 Article 160 of Italian Penal Code provides that “the limitation period shall be interrupted by judgment or conviction. An 
order applying protective measures […] and an order fixing the preliminary hearing […] shall also interrupt the limitation period. 
If it is interrupted, the limitation period shall start to run anew from the day of the interruption […]”.  
15 See ECJ, C-105/14, Taricco and others, 8 September 2015, § 46.  
16 In addition, for the ECJ, it is for the national court to verify whether the national provisions in question 
apply to cases of VAT evasion in the same manner as they apply to fraud affecting the Italian Republic’s own 
financial interests, as required under Article 325(2) TFEU. That would not be the case, in particular, if the 
second subparagraph of Article 161 of the Penal Code laid down longer limitation periods for offences, similar 
in nature and seriousness, affecting the Italian Republic’s financial interests. As the European Commission 
observed at the hearing before the Court, and subject to verification by the national court, Italian law does not 
lay down any absolute limitation period in respect of the offence of conspiracy to commit crimes in relation to 
import duties on tobacco products. See ECJ, C-105/14, Taricco and others, 8 September 2015, § 47 – 48.  
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Having considered these preliminary elements, the ECJ dealt with the consequences of the 
incompatibility of the national provisions at issue with EU law and the role of the national 
court. 
In this regard, the European Court clarified that if the national court concludes that the 
national provisions at issue do not satisfy the requirement of EU law that measures to 
counter VAT evasion be effective and dissuasive, that court would have to ensure that EU 
law is given full effect, if need be by disapplying those provisions, without having to request 
or await the prior repeal of those articles by way of legislation or any other constitutional 
procedure17.  
These, also, due to the fact that, in accordance with the principle of precedence of EU 
law, the provisions of Article 325 TFEU have the effect, in their relationship with the 
domestic law of the Member States, of rendering automatically inapplicable, by their mere 
entering into force, any conflicting provision of national law.  
At this point, the European judges affirmed very clearly that the extension of the 
limitation period and its immediate application do not entail an infringement of the principle 
of legality in criminal law, recognized by Article 49 of the EU Charter18 (and by Article 7 of 
ECHR), since those provisions cannot be interpreted as prohibiting an extension of 
limitation periods where the relevant offences have never became subject to limitation.  
For the ECJ, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – in 
particular one of its rulings on this issue: Coeme and Other v. Belgium, 22 June 2000 – support 
this conclusion.  
In the European perspective, in fact, the principle of legality in criminal law – considered 
also as one of the general legal principles underlying the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States – provides that no one is to be held guilty of any criminal offence on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national 
law or international law at the time when it was committed, and, furthermore, that a heavier 
penalty is not to be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence 
was committed. 
Therefore, in the reasoning of the Court, it is implicit the consideration that it cannot be 
inferred from the principle of legality, recognized by Art. 49 of the EU Charter, that the 
applicable rules on the length, course and interruption of the limitation period must of 
necessity always be determined in accordance with the statutory provisions that were in force 
at the time when the offence was committed.  
“No legitimate expectation to that effect exists” affirmed, in this regard, the Advocate General, by 
clarifying also that “the period of time within which a criminal offence may be prosecuted can still be altered 
even after the offence has been committed, so as long as the limitation period has not expired”19.  
On those grounds, the ECJ hereby rules: 
 A national rule in relation to limitation periods for criminal offences such as that 
laid down by the last subparagraph of Article 160 of the Penal Code, as amended 
                                               
17 See ECJ, C-105/14, Taricco and others, 8 September 2015, § 49.  
18 See M. D’AMICO, Articolo 49, in R. Bifulco, M. Cartabia, A. Celotto (a cura di), L’Europa dei diritti. Commento 
alla Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, Bologna, 2001, p. 334 ss.  
19 See the Opinion of Advocate General, C-105/14, 30 April 2015, § 119 - 120. 
     
6 
by Law No 251 of 5 December 2005, read in conjunction with Article 161 of that 
Code — which provided, at the material time in the main proceedings, that the 
interruption of criminal proceedings concerning serious fraud in relation to value 
added tax had the effect of extending the limitation period by only a quarter of its 
initial duration — is liable to have an adverse effect on fulfilment of the Member 
States’ obligations under Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU if that national rule prevents 
the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties in a significant number of cases 
of serious fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union, or 
provides for longer limitation periods in respect of cases of fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Member State concerned than in respect of those 
affecting the financial interests of the European Union, which it is for the national 
court to verify. The national court must give full effect to Article 325(1) and (2) 
TFEU, if need be by disapplying the provisions of national law the effect of which 
would be to prevent the Member State concerned from fulfilling its obligations 
under Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU; 
 A limitation system applicable to criminal offences in relation to value added tax 
such as that established by the last subparagraph of Article 160 of the Penal Code, 
as amended by Law No 251 of 5 December 2005, read in conjunction with 
Article 161 of that Code, cannot be assessed in the light of Articles 101 TFEU, 
107 TFEU and 119 TFEU. 
 
 
4. The reaction of the Italian Judges: between direct application of the Taricco 
rule and the request for counter-limits 
 
As it is well known, national courts had to guarantee the application of the ECJ’s decision, 
if need be with the disapplication of the domestic provisions20.  
This means, in the present case, that the Italian courts must disapply the national rules 
concerning the maximum extension of the limitation period in order to allow the effective 
prosecution of serious frauds affecting the financial interests of the Union, by giving full 
effect to Article 325 TFEU. 
However, in accordance with the judgment of the ECJ, national courts are not always 
obliged to disapply the domestic provisions. 
Indeed, the ECJ, in its ruling, specified two conditions under which the Italian courts are 
required to disregard the national rules of limitation period: 
 the requirement of a considerable number of cases of impunity, as a consequence of the 
normal application of the national rules;  
 the serious nature of the fraud (affecting the financial interests of the Union)  
That said, in Italy, some courts, with a very “obsequious” attitude to the authority of the 
ECJ, did not hesitate to directly perform the Taricco rule21, including the third division of the 
                                               
20 See P. FARAGUNA, The Italian Constitutional Court in re Taricco: “Gauweiler in the Roman Campagna”, cit.  
21 See D. TEGA, Narrowing the dialogue: the Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice on the Prosecution of 
VAT frauds, in I·CONnect blog, 2017.  
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Court of Cassation22 which, just few days after the ruling of the ECJ, disapplied the national 
rules with strong effects in malam partem for the defendants of that case.  
With an opposite approach, some months later, the fourth division of the Court of 
Cassation23 held that the double conditions provided by the ECJ for the disapplication were 
not met and, accordingly, decided to apply the national provisions.  
Other courts, such as the Milan Court of Appeal24 and the third division of the Court of 
Cassation (in a different composition from those mentioned above)25 have referred to the 
ICC a question concerning Article 2 of Law no. 130 of 2 August 200826, insofar as it 
authorises the ratification and gives legal effect to Article 325(1) and (2) of the TFEU, as 
interpreted by the judgment Taricco of the Grand Chamber of the ECJ27. 
With these requests, the ICC was asked to rule on whether the doctrine of counter-limits 
prevented national courts from enforcing the Taricco rule28. 
According to this doctrine, the principle of supremacy of EU law, pursuant to Article 11 
of the Italian Constitution29, must be balanced with the supreme principles of the Italian legal 
order: the compliance between the EU law and those principles is a prerequisite for the 
applicability of EU Law itself in the Italian system.  
This means that in the unlikely event that a specific European provision were not so 
compliant the ICC would rule unconstitutional the national law authorizing the ratification 
and implementation of the Treaties, solely insofar as it permits such a legislative scenario to 
arise30.  
That said, in cases pending before the Milan Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation, 
the judges were hearing prosecutions for tax fraud relating to the collection of VAT, which 
they consider to be serious and which would have been time-barred had national provisions 
been applicable, whilst otherwise the proceeding would have resulted in convictions.  
The referring courts also pointed out that the exemption from punishment resulting from 
application of national provisions concerning limitation period applies in a considerable number 
of cases.  
Therefore, in both proceedings, the double conditions provided by the ECJ have been 
met. 
                                               
22 See Court of Cassation, 2210/16, 17 September 2015, Def. Pennacchini.  
23 See Court of Cassation, 7914/16, 25 January 2016, Def. Tormenti and others.  
24 See Milan Court of Appeal, 6421/15, 18 September 2015, Def. De Bortoli and others.  
25 See Court of Cassation, 28364/16, 30 March 2016, Def. Cestari and others.  
26 Ratification and implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and certain related acts, with final act, protocols and declarations 
done in Lisbon on 13 December 2007. 
27 With different points of view, F. VIGANO’, Il caso Taricco davanti alla Corte costituzionale: qualche riflessione sul 
merito delle questioni, e sulla reale posta in gioco, in www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 2016; and V. MANES, La “svolta” Taricco 
e la potenziale “sovversione di sistema”: le ragioni dei controlimiti, in www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 2016.  
28 See again M. BASSINI, O. POLLICINO, The Taricco decision: a last attempt to avoid a clash between EU Law and 
the Italian Constitution, cit. 
29 Which states that “Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the 
settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that 
may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international 
organisations furthering such ends”. 
30 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 2. See also ICC; order no. 232 of 1989, no. 270 of 1984 and no. 183 of 
1973.   
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However, as seen above, the referring courts doubted that the disapplication imposed by 
the ECJ is compatible with the supreme principles of the Italian constitutional order and 
with the requirement to respect inalienable human rights31, with particular reference to the 
principle of legality in criminal matters, formally recognized by Article 25(2) of the Italian 
Constitution32.  
In this regard, the referring courts developed their arguments moving from the statement 
that the provisions concerning the limitation period are covered by the principle of legality. 
It is, consequently, necessary that these provisions are described in detail by means of a 
rule in force at the time the offence was committed.  
In other words, it means that all of the corollaries of the principle of legality (in particular, 
the principle of non retroactivity and the principle of certainty) - usually and traditionally recognized 
with regard to the offence and the punishment - must be applied also to the rules of 
limitation periods.   
For the referring judges, the disapplication imposed by the ECJ runs counter, in particular, 
the principle of legality for two fundamental reasons: 
1) the requirement of considerable number of cases – because of its vagueness – infringes the 
principle of certainty; 
2) the extension of limitation period for offences committed before 8 September 2015 
(the day of the ECJ’s decision) results in a retroactive increase in the severity of the 
punishment regime, in breach of the principle of non retroactivity; 
 
 
5. The decision of the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC): a courageous stance or 
a prudent openness to dialogue? 
 
As anticipated in the introduction, the ICC decided the referred question with the rule no. 
24 of 2017.  
The premise from which the ICC moves to elaborate its own arguments is as follow: “there 
is no doubt that the principle of legality in criminal matters is an expression of a supreme principle of the legal 
order, which has been posited in order to safeguard the inviolable rights of the individual insofar as it requires 
that criminal rules must be precise and must not have retroactive effect”33.  
This is a crucial statement, full of implications.  
Within the national system, in fact, the supreme principles represents an essential, albeit 
controversial, category34: the supreme principles qualify the constitutional identity of the 
State but they are not listed exhaustively in the Constitution. It is true that the ICC, in its 
                                               
31 As laid down by Article 3, 11, 24, 25(2) 27(3) and 101(2) of the Constitution.  
32 Article 25(2) of the Italian Constitution states that “no punishment may be inflicted except by virtue of a law in force at 
the time the offence was committed”. The Milan Court of Appeal, in particular, focused its decision on Article 25(2) 
of the Italian Constitution. On the principle of legality in criminal law, see See M. D’AMICO, Sub Art. 25, 
comma 2, Cost., in R. Bifulco, A. Celotto, M. Olivetti (a cura di), Commentario alla Costituzione, Torino, 2006, p. 
536 ss. 
33 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 2.  
34 See P. FARAGUNA, Ai confini della Costituzione. Principi supremi e identità costituzionale, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 
2015.  
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case-law, has been called upon to deal with this category35, nevertheless it has never clarified 
which and how many are the supreme principles36. 
Anyhow, it is important to note that the element which characterises the supreme 
principles is that they cannot be changed by legislator, even by means of the constitutional 
review procedure, and compliance with them, as already said, is a prerequisite for the 
applicability of EU law in Italy37.  
It follows that if a norm - like Article 325 TFUE as interpreted by the ECJ - of the Treaty 
results in a legal norm that is contrary to the supreme principles, the ICC has the duty to 
prohibit38.  
In the light of foregoing, the ICC, by directly addressing the complaints of the referring 
judges, affirms that, within the national legal order, the rules of limitation periods are subject 
to the principle of legality in criminal matters laid down by Article 25(2) of the 
Constitution39.  
In this perspective, the ICC reminds that limitation is an institute that “impinges upon the 
liability to punishment of individuals, and the law consequently regulates it on the basis of an assessment that 
is made with reference to the level of social alarm caused by a certain offence and the idea that, following the 
passage of time after the commission of the offence, the requirements for the punishment have diminished and 
the author has acquired a right for it to be forgotten”40.    
In this respect, it must be pointed out that this is the choice made by the Italian legislator, 
which - by the evidence - is not the only possible: it is well known, in fact, - as observed by 
the ICC - that certain Member States embrace a procedural conception of limitation (to 
which the judgment given in the Taricco case is closer, based also on the case law of the 
ECtHR)41. 
In the light of above, the ICC passes to address the most controversial issue of the  
judgment given in the Taricco case: whether the rule inferred from the decision of the ECJ 
fulfils the requirements of certainty, which is a constitutionally needed - as already mentioned 
- for the provisions of substantive criminal law42.  
In the ICC’s perspective, this verification operates on two different levels.  
First and foremost, is necessary to ascertain the requirement of foreseeability of the rule laid 
down in the judgment given in the Taricco case.  
                                               
35 See, in particular, ICC, order no. 18 of 1982 and 238 of 2014.  
36 In fact, the ICC attributed this tag in a few cases and always to the specific principle sub judice.  
37 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 2.  
38 See M. BASSINI, O. POLLICINO, The Taricco decision: a last attempt to avoid a clash between EU Law and the 
Italian Constitution, cit.  
39 As has been repeatedly acknowledged by the same Constitutional Court. Cfr., ex multis, ICC, order no. 143 
of 2014.   
40 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 4.  
41 The ICC then proceeds affirming that “however, there are other States, such as Spain, which adopt a substantive concept 
of limitation that does not differ from that applied in Italy” (Cfr. ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 4).   
42 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 5. Cfr. M. D’AMICO, Principio di legalità penale e “dialogo” tra le Corti. 
Osservazioni a margine del caso Taricco, cit.; I. PELLIZZONE, Principio di determinatezza, separazione dei poteri e ruolo 
del giudice penale: le sollecitazioni del caso Taricco, in Forum di Quaderni costituzionali, 2017.  
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For the ICC, this requirement - broadly enhanced in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court43 - is not fulfilled in the present case: an individual could not have reasonably 
considered, prior to the judgment given by the ECJ, that Article 325 TFUE requires the 
national judges to disregard the Italian rules of limitation period “in situations in which this would 
have resulted in an exemption from punishment in a considerable number of cases involving serious fraud 
affecting the financial interest of the Union”44. 
Secondly, it is necessary to examine whether the requirement of certainty is respected in 
the Taricco rule, with particular regard to the power of the courts, which cannot be 
empowered to make choices based on discretionary assessments of criminal policy.   
For the ICC, the rule laid down by the ECJ cannot be interpreted with a minimum and 
sufficient standard of certainty. In particular, the requirement of “considerable number of cases”, 
upon which the effect indicated by the ECJ is conditional, is so vague and ambiguous that 
every courts could interpret it in a discretionary way, without any guarantee of objective.  
Indeed, what is “considerable” for one court can be “non considerable” for another one, with 
enormous implications for the defendant involved in the case.  
At this point, the ICC further clarifies that the period of time necessary in order for 
limitation of an offence to operate and the legal operations which must be carried out to 
calculate it must result from application by the criminal courts of legal rules that are 
sufficiently precise45.  
At the end of its decision, the ICC also observes that the ECJ in its judgment held that 
there was no incompatibility between the rule asserted therein concerning Article 49 of the 
Charter and the sole prohibition on retroactivity, but did not examine the other corollary of 
the principle of legality, namely the requirement that the provision concerning the regime of 
punishment must be sufficiently precise.  
In this regard, for the ICC, even if the limitation were considered procedural in nature, or 
even if it were possible to regulate limitation through a legislation enacted after the offence 
was committed, this would not affect the principle that the activity of the criminal courts 
must be governed by legal provisions that are sufficiently precise46.  This principle - which 
encapsulates a defining feature of the constitutional systems of the Member States of civil 
law tradition47 - does not grant “the courts the power to create new criminal law in place of that 
established by legislation approved by Parliament, and in any case reject the notion that the criminal courts 
may be charged with fulfilling a purpose, albeit defined by law, if the law does not specify in what manner and 
within limits this may occur”48.  
                                               
43 See V. ZAGREBELSKY, La Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e il principio di legalità penale, in La 
Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo nell’ordinamento penale italiano (a cura di) V. MANES e V. ZAGRBELSKY, 
Giuffrè, 2011; e A. BERNARDI, Art. 7, in Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e 
delle libertà fondamentali (a cura di) S. BARTOLE, B. CONFORTI e G. RAIMONDI, Cedam, 2001, p. 249 ss.  
44 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 5.  
45 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 5.  
46 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 9.  
47 See M. D’AMICO, Principio di legalità penale e “dialogo” tra le Corti. Osservazioni a margine del caso Taricco, cit., p. 
106.  
48 See ICC, order no. 24 of 2017, § 9. 
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In conclusion, the ICC orders that three different questions concerning the interpretation 
of Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU be referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling pursuant to 
Article 267 TFUE. 
In particular, the ICC asks the ECJ if the Article 325(1) and (2) of the TFEU must be 
interpreted as requiring the criminal courts to disregard national legislation concerning 
limitation periods even when there is not a sufficiently precise legal basis for setting aside 
such legislation or even when limitation is part of the substantive criminal law in the Member 
State’s legal system and is, consequently,  subject to the principle of legality. 
And furthermore, if the judgment Taricco of the Grand Chamber of the ECJ must be 
interpreted as said above even when setting aside such legislation would contrast with the 
supreme principles of the constitutional order of the Member State or with the inalienable 
human rights recognized under the Constitution of the Member State. 
The ICC’s ruling, for all of these reasons, only apparently can be considered, at the same 
time, as a prudent openness to dialogue and a courageous stance49. 
On one hand, in fact, the choice not to directly use the counter-limits power expresses the 
cooperative will of the ICC; on the other, when looking to the content of the motivations of 
the ruling no. 24, is very clear the intention of the Italian court of defending the 
constitutional identity of the Italian system, which is provided, for the criminal matters, by 
the principle formalized in Article 25(2) of the Italian Constitution.  
 
 
6. Future developments: waiting for Taricco-bis..  
 
At the time, it is quite difficult to anticipate the result of the Taricco-bis case: there are 
several aspects, in fact, which make the forthcoming ruling of the ECJ extremely 
unpredictable.  
On this basis, it is however possible to formulate some considerations. 
First of all, it is important to note that the ICC, because of the relevance of the case, asked 
that the reference for a preliminary ruling be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure 
(accordingly to Art. 105(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ)50. 
That said, from a substantial point of view, it must be pointed out that the ECJ, in this 
case, is called to reinterpret its own decision51 and this circumstance causes a lot of 
difficulties.  
                                               
49 See M. BASSINI, O. POLLICINO, The Taricco decision: a last attempt to avoid a clash between EU Law and the 
Italian Constitution, cit 
50 Which states as fallow: “at the request of the referring court or tribunal or, exceptionally, of his own motion, the President of 
the Court may, where the nature of the case requires that it be dealt with within a short time, after hearing the JudgeRapporteur 
and the Advocate General, decide that a reference for a preliminary ruling is to be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure 
derogating from the provisions of these Rules”. See CJE, C-42/17, M.A.S. e M.B.  
51 See P. FARAGUNA, The Italian Constitutional Court in re Taricco: “Gauweiler in the Roman Campagna”, cit. For the 
A.: “the in Taricco, the CJEU is called to reinterpret its own decision, after the ICC essentially asked “please, say it again?”. We 
shall now see whether the CJEU will “say it again” in a way that the ICC will consider compatible with a (apodictically affirmed) 
peculiar notion of constitutional identity”.  
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Indeed, if confirms its first ruling, the European Court could provoke the ICC into taking, 
for real, a courageous stance, by definitely denying the compatibility of EU law with supreme 
principles of the Italian constitutional legal order.  
In any case, for many authors52, the ECJ is now in an awkward position, but it does not 
lack escape solutions.  
There are, in fact, some elements that the Court of Luxembourg could enhance in order to 
“disarm the bomb” Taricco.  
There is, in particular, a part of the first ruling in which the ECJ stated that “if the national 
court decides to disapply the national provisions at issue, it must also ensure that the fundamental rights of the 
person concerned are respected”53.  
In this perspective, therefore, the ECJ –  by recognizing that the application of the Taricco 
rule within the Italian system contrasts with the supreme principle of legality in criminal law 
(because of the substantive nature of the limitation period rules) – could rethink its prior 
position: 
 Narrowing down the requirement of considerable number of cases; 
 Considering applicable the Taricco rule only to the offences committed after 8 
September 2015.  
 
                                               
52 See, in particular, D. TEGA, Narrowing the dialogue: the Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice on the 
Prosecution of VAT frauds, cit.  
53 See ECJ, C-105/14, Taricco and others, 8 September 2015, § 47.  
